Judges\u27 Bench Memorandum: Seventh Annual Pace National Environmental Moot Court Competition by Pace Environmental Law Review, Editorial Staff of the
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 Spring 1995 Article 6
April 1995
Judges' Bench Memorandum: Seventh Annual
Pace National Environmental Moot Court
Competition
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
, Judges' Bench Memorandum: Seventh Annual Pace National Environmental Moot Court Competition, 12
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 751 (1995)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/6
JUDGES' BENCH MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF NEW UNION
V.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR )
and ) Civ. No. 94-214
SUNPEACE )
)V.)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE )
INTERIOR )
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. May New Union assess civil penalties for CRACT's vio-
lations of the NUCAA occurring from September 30, 1989,
through April 27, 1993, despite the United States' claim
that CRACT has sovereign immunity?
2. Is CRACT subject to judicial review for NEPA compli-
ance of the Environmental Impact Statement CRACT has
prepared, despite its assertion that it has elected to follow
NEPA voluntarily in this case rather than by statutory
requirement?
* This brief has been reprinted in its original form. No revisions have
been made by the editorial staff of the Pace Environmental Law Review.
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I. Administrative Civil Penalties
CRACT admits that if it were not a government facility,
it would be liable for the penalties assessed by NUDEQ.
However, CRACT asserts, in Clean Air Act section 118 Con-
gress has not waived the federal government's sovereign im-
munity to punitive sanctions such as the $300,000 assessed
here. Citing Hancock v. Train, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20555 (U.S. 1976), CRACT asserts that waivers of sov-
ereign immunity must be "clear and unambiguous." Citing to
the Supreme Court's construction of the sovereign immunity
waivers in the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) in United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20804
(1992), CRACT asserts that the Clean Air Act waiver does not
reach punitive sanctions.
While it is clear that the Supreme Court found that the
Clean Water Act and RCRA waivers are not sufficient, I none-
theless am persuaded by New Union's arguments, supported
by Sunpeace as amicus, that sovereign immunity has been
waived under the Clean Air Act. First, I note that federal
agencies are "persons" under Clean Air Act section 302(e),
and that they were not so defined under RCRA and the Clean
Water Act at the time of the Supreme Court's 1992 decision.
(Partially in response to the Supreme Court's 1992 decision, I
note that Congress has since amended RCRA. Public Law
102-386, Oct. 6, 1992.) In this light, Clean Air Act section
118 must be read in conjunction with the citizen suit section,
section 304. Second, I find the legislative history far clearer
in the Clean Air Act than in the Clean Water Act or RCRA as
those statutes were before the Court in 1992. Third, while
the Clean Water Act required that civil penalties be "arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to en-
force an order or the process of such court," 33 U.S.C. 1323(a),
I find no such limit in Clean Air Act section 118.
Consequently, while I acknowledge that the waiver of
sovereign immunity must be "clear and unambiguous," and
that thus doubts of statutory construction must be resolved in
1995] 757
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CRACT's favor, in this case I conclude that New Union and
Sunpeace have met this burden of construction and that
CRACT is liable for the penalty assessed.
II. Adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement
As Sunpeace identified in its comments on the draft EIS,
and asserts again here, an EIS must analyze the "no action"
alternative. CRACT's defense, which New Union endorses as
an amicus, is that this is not an ordinary EIS. CRACT as-
serts that it promised to prepare an EIS voluntarily, rather
than because CRACT was legally required to do so. CRACT
points out that in June 1993 it published a FONSI, which
Sunpeace concedes it did not timely challenge, finding that
any operation of ICTE that complies with NUCAA standards
has no significant impact on the human environment. Thus,
CRACT says, neither of the two alternatives it identified nor
the "no action" alternative suggested by Sunpeace meet the
criteria for requiring an EIS. Consequently, CRACT argues,
it satisfied NEPA requirements when it issued the June 1993
FONSI, and all work since then has been above and beyond
the requirements of NEPA and thus not subject to judicial
review.
Sunpeace answers that CRACT cannot have it both
ways. CRACT cannot promise to undertake to prepare some-
thing it will call an "Environmental Impact Statement on the
ICTE program" without also implicitly promising to make
that EIS conform to NEPA. Basically, Sunpeace argues, if
CRACT is to hold the document out as an EIS, it must meet
all EIS requirements.
CRACT's and New Union's response is that CRACT's
Federal Register announcement never promised NEPA com-
pliance and to read that into the promise is circular reason-
ing. All CRACT promised, it is asserted, is to prepare an EIS,
not to subject that EIS to judicial scrutiny.
Finally, and somewhat more troubling to me, CRACT
and New Union point out that NEPA does not itself create a
right of judicial review, and so judicial review of EISs is
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Here, they say, "the
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/6
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APA does not reach a claim that boils down to false advertis-
ig in describing a federal document rather than an underly-
ig violation of a statute such as NEPA." The bottom line,
they assert, is that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to hear Sunpeace's claim.
I find CRACT's and New Union's arguments just too cre-
ative for this court. If CRACT undertakes to prepare an EIS,
I am going to hold it to the normal standards of judicial re-
view for an EIS, and I conclude that Sunpeace has the better
arguments here.
Orders consistent with this decision are issued herewith.
/s/
R. N. Remus
United States District Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) owns and op-
erates the Coal Research Activity (CRACT) in the state of
New Union. The facility is a research plant evaluating new
methods and techniques of mining, burning, transporting,
and packaging coal. (R.1). New Union is a major coal produc-
ing state and CRACT, which employs 800 persons, is the
principal employer in Cathertown. (R.1).
In April 1985, CRACT began its "Improved Coal Trans-
port Experiment" (ICTE), which tested packing more coal
into containers by heating the coal to 400 degrees Fahrenheit
and then shaking the coal, creating small granules and al-
lowing denser packing of the coal. This allowed the coal to be
economically shipped by truck. (R.3).
This process caused escape of large quantities of particu-
late matter (PM). On September 30, 1989, CRACT was cited
by New Union's Department of Environmental Quality
(NUDEQ) for violations of its PM standards under the New
Union Clean Air Act (NUCAA) and its SIP authority. The
Administrator notified CRACT of its violations.
The facts in this paragraph are stipulated to by both par-
ties. Nothing materially changed from September 30, 1989,
until April 27, 1993, when NUDEQ again inspected the facil-
1995] 759
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ity and found the identical process continuing, at which time
the inspectors assessed $300,000 in civil penalties. (R.3).
CRACT contacted NUDEQ claiming sovereign immunity
from such penalties but acknowledged its duty to comply with
NUCAA substantively. CRACT assured NUDEQ it would
come into compliance with NUCAA by building a $3,000,000
hangar and baghouse around ICTE. (R.3).
Sunpeace, a non-profit citizens group, publicly criticized
the plan and CRACT generally, demanding CRACT be closed.
(R.3). CRACT responded on June 23, 1993 by publishing no-
tice in the Federal Register stating CRACT would prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the ICTE program
even though the hangar and baghouse will not significantly
affect the human environment. The hangar and baghouse
were deferred until the decision on the EIS and the ICTE pro-
gram was reduced to conform with NUCAA in the interim. A
Finding of No Significance (FONSI) accompanied the docu-
ment. (R.4).
The DEIS was published in December 1993 listing two
alternatives, one with high volume operations with a hangar
and baghouse, and the other at reduced volume and no han-
gar and baghouse. Both would comply with NUCAA. (R.4).
Sunpeace submitted comments stating a "no action" alterna-
tive, i.e. the cessation of ICTE, was required. CRACT re-
sponded that inclusion of this alternative was not required by
"this EIS". A Final EIS has been published and a decision
opting for the high volume operation with the hangar and
baghouse has been reached. (R.4).
Sunpeace timely filed suit in this court under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the EIS is
inadequate and properly basing Sunpeace's standing on the
interests of its members who live in the vicinity of CRACT
and are affected by its impacts on the environment. Soon
thereafter, New Union filed suit against CRACT to enforce
and collect its $300,000 civil penalty. The two cases have
been consolidated for decision, and by consent of the parties
Sunpeace and New Union are amici on the suits to which




I. MAY NEW UNION ASSESS CIVIL PENALTIES FOR
CRACT'S VIOLATIONS OF THE NUCAA OCCURRING
FROM SEPTEMBER 30, 1989, THROUGH APRIL 27,
1993, DESPITE THE UNITED STATES' CLAIM THAT
CRACT HAS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
[New Union and, as amicus, Sunpeace answer in the affirma-
tive, and the United States, on behalf of the DOI's CRACT,
answers in the negative.]
A. The Background of the Clean Air Act and the
Authority of States to Enforce Regulations.
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 &
Supp. II 1990), was enacted to protect and improve the air
quality of the nation, and was one of the first environmental
statutes created by Congress. It was initially enacted in 1963
and significantly amended in 1970, 1977 and again in 1990.
As much as any other environmental statute, the Clean Air
Act envisioned a significant role for the states in controlling
and preventing air pollution both within and across their bor-
ders. see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(c), 7402(a), 7407(a) (1988 & Supp.
II 1990).
Each state is authorized under the Clean Air Act to adopt
an implementation plan (SIP) to provide for the "implementa-
tion, maintenance, and enforcement" of the national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). In order to enforce such stan-
dards, states are given the authority to assess and collect
penalties for the noncompliance with an authorized program.
42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). This authority ex-
tends to the "person who owns or operates" any stationary
source not in compliance. Id. A "person" under the Clean Air
Act is defined to include "any agency, department, or instru-
mentality of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1988 &
Supp. II 1990). However, section 7420 only applies to any
noncompliance by a "major stationary source" (emission of
more than 100 tons per year of any pollutant), or to any other
stationary source in violation of specific sections of the Act.
1995] 761
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For the State of New Union to enforce under section 7420,
argument would have to be made that CRACT's noncompli-
ance with the New Union particulate matter standards is in
violation of one of these specific sections: new source perform-
ance standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7411; hazardous air pollutants,
42 U.S.C. § 7412; sources causing significant deterioration,
42 U.S.C. § 7477; standard established under emergency
powers, 42 U.S.C. § 7603; or any requirement under the sub-
chapters covering acid deposition, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o,
permitting, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f, or ozone protection, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q.
Alternative enforcement for the State of New Union may
be found in the citizen suit provision of the Act. This section
provides for the commencement of a suit by any person (a
state is also defined as a person under the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7602(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)) and the imposition of civil
penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The only
prerequisite applicable to the case at bar is the necessity of
notification prior to commencement of the action. This notifi-
cation of the violation must be made more than sixty days
prior to commencement and must be given to the Administra-
tor (of the EPA), to the state in which the violation occurs,
and to the violator. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. II
1990). As to notification in this case of all applicable parties,
i.e. the Administrator, the issue was not raised below by the
Department of the Interior and is not preserved on appeal.
B. Does Section 118 of the Clean Air Act Waive
Sovereign Immunity for a Federal Facility?
1. The language of the statute.
The federal government, its agencies and related ap-
pendages, enjoy immunity from state claims and actions un-
less this protection is specifically relinquished by statute.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). It is
presumed that Congress has not waived this privilege unless
the intent of Congress is clear and unambiguous. Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976). In this case the question
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/6
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of a waiver of sovereign immunity arises in connection with
section 7418 of the Clean Air Act. That section reads:
(a) Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal
Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or
facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which
may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, and each of-
ficer, agent, or employee thereof, shall be subject to , and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pol-
lution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity. The preceding sentence shall ap-
ply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or proce-
dural (including any recordkeeping or reporting
requirement, any requirement respecting permits and any
other requirement whatsoever), (B) to any requirement to
pay a fee or charge imposed by any State or local agency to
defray the costs of its air pollution regulatory program, (C)
to the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administra-
tive authority, and (D) to any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts, or in
any other manner. This subsection shall apply notwith-
standing any immunity of such agencies, officers, agents,
or employees under any law or rule of law. No officer,
agent, or employee of the United States shall be personally
liable for any civil penalty for which he is not otherwise
liable.
42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
The precise clarity and ambiguity associated with section
118 of the Clean Air Act should be the main point of any ar-
gument as to the unequivocal intent of Congress. Initially,
the language of the statute should be exclusively assessed to
determine its meaning. If the language is unambiguous, the
clear meaning of the statute is applied and "judicial inquiry is
complete." Burlington N.R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481
U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449
U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). This language is ordinarily conclusive,
and only in the most unusual cases where the intent of Con-
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gress is so obviously opposite to the literal interpretation of
the statute will further study of the legislative history be suf-
fered. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989).
All parties may argue for the acceptance of the statutory
language as is stands, the key portions being the meaning of
"process and sanction" and the applicability of the statute
"notwithstanding any immunity". 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a). The
question arises as to whether "sanction" includes punitive
penalties, as found in this case, as well as coercive penalties.
Sanction, in its ordinary meaning, is a "penalty or other
mechanism of enforcement used to provide incentives for obe-
dience with the law" and "part of a law which is designed to
secure enforcement by imposing a penalty for its violation."
Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (6th ed. 1990).
Also considered must be the pairing of the terms "process
and sanction". Is the conjunctive such that there must be
some form of "process" prior to the implementation of a "sanc-
tion"? If so, discussion should be made as to the nature of
such a process, whether the process New Union has followed
here is sufficient or does the term refer to a type of formal
judicial process.
Finally, the intent of Congress in incorporating the
phrase "notwithstanding any immunity" must be discussed.
If the sanctions mentioned previously are applicable to the
case here, this phrase would seem to confirm the waiver of
sovereign immunity. If, however, question remains as to the
applicability of punitive damages as assessed here, does this
clause stand on its own as a waiver of CRACT's sovereign
immunity?
2. Previous court decisions regarding waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Clean Air Act.
Hancock v. Train, et al.
The primary source cited for authority on the waiver of
sovereign immunity in section 118 of the Clean Air Act is
Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976). The debate does not
end with the Court's interpretation of the waiver clause in
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Hancock, but begins here, as the 1977 amendments changing
the wording of section 118 were passed after, and some will
argue as a result of, the Hancock decision. Under the 1970
version of the Clean Air Act, section 118 read, "Each depart-
ment, agency, and instrumentality... shall comply with Fed-
eral, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that
any person is subject to such requirements." Hancock at 171-
72, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857f. The case revolved around Ken-
tucky's requirement that federal facilities secure a state oper-
ating permit if the facility released any air emissions. The
various agencies' refusal to do so precipitated Kentucky's suit
to force compliance.
The Court in determining the clarity of a possible waiver
of sovereign immunity in section 118 focused on the omis-
sions from the language of the statute. Specifically, the Court
noted that though section 118 required federal facilities to
comply with state regulations, it failed to specify that the fa-
cilities should comply with all requirements. Hancock at 182.
In the absence of this all-encompassing language the Court
stated that the requirement of a state permit as applied to a
federal facility would subject that facility to state control, or a
waiver of sovereign immunity, and such intention of Con-
gress was not unambiguously stated.
Few courts have addressed the waiver in section 118
since the enactment of the 1977 amendments. In the case
most nearly on point to the instant case, a district court in
Alabama found that sovereign immunity had been waived in
section 118 and civil penalties could be assessed against the
federal facility. Alabama ex rel. Graddick v. Veterans Ad-
min., 648 F. Supp. 1208 (M.D. Ala. 1986). The court in Ala-
bama found that the statute clearly provided for federal
facilities to submit to "all state regulations" and to subject
themselves to "all state sanctions." Id. at 1211.
In United States v. South Coast Air Quality Management
Dist., 748 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1990), the court found a
waiver of sovereign immunity in section 118 which extended
to the assessment of certain state imposed fees. Though the
question of availability of civil penalties was adjourned to a
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later date, the court in determining the waiver of sovereign
immunity noted from the language of the statute that "Con-
gress intended a waiver of all immunity absent any exclu-
sions." Id. at 738.
3. Court decisions in waiver of sovereign immunity in
other statutes. United States Dep't of Energy v.
Ohio, et al.
The clarity of waiver provisions in other statutes as de-
cided by various courts may be instructive as to the interpre-
tation given to the Clean Air Act provisions here. The prime
case, and the one heavily relied upon by the appellant in the
court below, is United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112
S.Ct. 1627 (1992). In Dep't of Energy v. Ohio the Supreme
Court addressed the issues of sovereign immunity waivers
within both the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Ohio, under both
statutes, attempted to assess civil penalties for past viola-
tions of the CWA and RCRA by a federal facility operated by
the Department of Energy.
The terminology of the applicable federal facilities sec-
tion of the CWA was nearly identical to section 118 of the
Clean Air Act at issue here. The only significant change was
the addition of the following phrase in the CWA: "the United
States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to en-
force an order or the process of such court." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a) (1988).
The Court first distinguished between coercive and puni-
tive fines, defining coercive as those "fines imposed to induce
[federal facilities] to comply with injunctions or other judicial
orders designed to modify behavior prospectively", and puni-
tive as those fines "imposed to punish past violations of those
statutes or state laws supplanting them." Dep't of Energy v.
Ohio at 1632. The term "sanction" as used in the CWA § 1323
was identified by the Court to incorporate civil penalties. The
question raised by the Court was whether this term necessar-
ily included punitive fines, the sort at issue in Dep't of Energy
v. Ohio as well as the case at bar. The Court found initially
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that the term "sanction" could incorporate both coercive and
punitive fines and proceeded to look at the context of its us-
age to determine if the intent of Congress could be clarified.
Id. at 1636-37. The Court noted that sanction was paired
with the term "process" in both instances of its usage in the
CWA section, and that "process" normally referred to an adju-
dicatory procedure. Although "substantive" requirements
was also included in this section, which would apply to statu-
tory requirements such as the permit process at issue and its
penalties for past violations, the "sanctions" had been teamed
with "process" which the Court deemed to be "forward-look-
ing orders" enforced by coercive fines. Id. at 1637. The Court
concluded that Congress' intent was to use the term sanction
in its coercive sense and, thus, there was no waiver of sover-
eign immunity as it applied to punitive penalties of the sort
Ohio wished to assess in that case.
In reviewing the language of RCRA's federal facilities
section, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988), the Court again found that
only coercive, and not punitive, fines were included in the
waiver created in the statute. In addition to analysis similar
to its reasoning regarding the CWA statute, the Court deter-
mined that RCRA's language, "waiving immunity 'from any
process or sanction of any State or Federal Court with respect
to the enforcement of any such injunctive relief,'" specifically
included only coercive sanctions, and the absence of specific
mention of punitive sanctions excluded them from the
waiver. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio at 1639-40.
Subsequent to the decision in Dep't of Energy v. Ohio,
Congress amended RCRA to incorporate a waiver of sover-
eign immunity for both coercive and punitive type sanctions.
The amended statute reads:
[tlhe Federal, State, interstate, and local substantive and
procedural requirements referred to in this subsection in-
clude, but are not limited to, all administrative orders and
all civil and administrative penalties and fines, regardless
of whether such penalties or fines are punitive or coercive
in nature... The United States hereby expressly waives
any immunity otherwise applicable... with respect to any
such administrative or procedural requirement (including
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... any ... civil or administrative fine referred to in the
preceding sentence...).
42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
Argument could be made by the appellant that Congress
knows how to clearly waive sovereign immunity as to puni-
tive fines when it sees the need, as it has done in the RCRA
amendments, and that it has not done so within the Clean
Air Act. Appellant may also suggest that though the Court
ruled that the CWA, whose language is nearly identical to the
CAA, also failed to waive sovereign immunity, Congress took
no action to amend the CAA thereby implying that the Court
was correctly interpreted Congress' intent and section 1323 of
the CWA does not waive sovereign immunity for punitive
fines. The appellee must distinguish between the CWA and
RCRA statutes and the Clean Air Act or, in the alternative,
must find grounds to dispute the Court's findings in regards
to the two statutes.
C. Does Section 304 of the Clean Air Act Waive
Sovereign Immunity for a Federal Facility?
As with section 118, if the Citizen's Suit section of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), is to
independently waive sovereign immunity as it relates to the
imposition by the state of punitive fines, it must do so clearly
and unambiguously. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79
(1976). Under section 304, any person (including a State as
defined in section 302) may bring a civil action "against any
person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency... alleged to have vio-
lated . . . an emission standard or limitation" 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The section further defines
"emission standard or limitation" as "any requirement to ob-
tain a permit as a condition of operation." Id. § 7604(f)(4).
The only mention of penalties authorizes the district court to
"apply any appropriate civil penalties." Id. § 7604(a).
Does the language of section 304 clearly establish a
waiver of sovereign immunity regarding punitive penalties?
If the section could be read to include either coercive or puni-
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tive penalties, or both, the Court's interpretation would seem
to indicate that the meaning is not unambiguous. If the sec-
tion is not unambiguous standing alone, could it be read in
conjunction with section 118 to validate a waiver? Section
304(e) in stipulating other rights available states, "[n]othing
in this section or in any other law of the United States shall
be construed to prohibit... any State... from... obtaining
any judicial remedy or sanction... against the United States,
any department, agency, or instrumentality .... For provi-
sions requiring compliance by the United States... see sec-
tion 7418 .... " Id. § 7604(e). This refers the party back to
section 118 if compliance is sought by the State, indicating
the waiver must be contained either in section 118 alone or in
a conjunctive reading between the two sections.
D. Is it the Intent of Congress to Waive Sovereign
Immunity Under the Clean Air Act?
1. The use of legislative history to determine
Congressional intent.
If the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face the
court's inquiry is at an end. The question arises as to the
necessity or propriety of further examination by the court if
the statute is ambiguous or unclear on its face. The appellant
will argue that Congress' intent was at best ambiguous re-
garding the waiver of sovereign immunity in the CAA, and
that the inquiry should end with this finding. The appellee
will argue that the waiver is clear and unambiguous, as is
further evidenced by the legislative history of the act. If the
court should find that the statute does not sufficiently evince
the intent of Congress, the appellee will argue for the use of
the legislative history as a clear indication of its intent.
The Court has both utilized and denied at various times
the use of legislative history to determine the unequivocal
waiver of sovereign immunity clauses. In Hancock v. Train
the Court examined the legislative history of section 118 of
the CAA to aid in its determination as to the exact meaning
Congress wished to impart with its phraseology. Hancock v.
Train, 426 U.S. 167, 188-90 (1976).
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In contrast to Hancock the Court in United States v. Nor-
dic Village, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992), in determining if cer-
tain sections of the Bankruptcy Code waived sovereign
immunity as it applied to a demand by the bankruptcy
trustee for return of funds held by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, refused to consider the legislative history of these Bank-
ruptcy Code sections. The Court was able to read several
possible meanings into the pertinent sections, which would
have precluded any effective waiver of immunity and barred
recovery by the trustee. The various possible interpretations
of the statute, in the Court's eyes, clearly meant the statute
was not "unambiguous" on this point. And where the statute
was not unambiguous on its face, "legislative history has no
bearing on the ambiguity point.... [An] 'unequivocal expres-
sion' of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon
is an expression in statutory text. If clarity does not exist
there, it cannot be supplied by a committee report." Nordic
Village at 1016. Under this reasoning, a statute is either am-
biguous or unambiguous on its face, and no need is found to
explore the legislative history to supply an otherwise unclear
Congressional intent.
2. Legislative history of section 118.
Section 118 of the Clean Air Act as originally passed and
amended in 1970 called for compliance by federal facilities
with all "Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements
respecting control and abatement of air pollution to the same
extent that any person is subject to such requirements." H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970). No other
reference was made as to the duties of federal facilities to
comply with state requirements, and no direct reference was
made as to a waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal
government.
It was this language which was present before the Court
when it determined in Hancock v. Train that section 118 did
not incorporate a waiver of sovereign immunity regarding the
necessity of a federal facility to secure a state issued permit.
The Act was again amended immediately subsequent to the
Hancock decision. Section 118 of the Act was amended in
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1977 to include language generally identical to the language
of today's statute. In determining the appropriate language
for section 118, Congressional committees noted several in-
tentions of the new statute. First, committees from both
houses noted the intention of Congress as it related to several
court decisions. In a Senate committee report, the committee
remarked that one federal court had correctly construed Con-
gressional intent in its decision of Alabama v. Seeber, 502
F.2d 1238 (1974). S. Rep. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1977). In that case Alabama sought injunctive and declara-
tory relief to require a federal facility to obtain a permit for
operation. The court found that section 118 authorized suits
against federal facilities for violations of permit require-
ments. Seeber, 502 F.2d at 1248. Though finding the Act
waived sovereign immunity in this case, the court did not
mention punitive sanctions specifically.
The House, in reports from committee, referred to Han-
cock v. Train and its intention of overriding the Court's deci-
sion in that case. "The new section 113 of the bill is intended
to overturn the Hancock case and to express, with sufficient
clarity, the committee's desire to subject Federal facilities to
all Federal, State, and local requirements - procedural, sub-
stantive, or otherwise - process, and sanctions." H.R. Rep. No.
294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1278. The committee also expressed its
belief regarding that federal facilities would be subject to cer-
tain types of sanctions. "The amendment is also intended to
resolve any question about the sanctions to which noncomply-
ing Federal agencies, facilities... may be subject.... This
means that Federal facilities and agencies may be subject to
injunctive relief . . . to civil or criminal penalties, and to
delayed compliance penalties." H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1279.
Appellees will argue that the congressional reports make
it clear that Congress intended there to be a waiver of sover-
eign immunity even for punitive fines. If there is any ques-
tion from the language of the statute itself, these reports
illuminate the true intent. The appellant will argue that
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these reports made by committee are not reflected in the final
bill. If the language was intended to produce "with sufficient
clarity" the waiver of all sovereign immunity, the drafters
would have expressly stated this, which was not done.
IL IS CRACT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR
NEPA COMPLIANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT CRACT HAS PREPARED,
DESPITE ITS ASSERTION THAT IT HAS ELECTED
TO FOLLOW NEPA VOLUNTARILY IN THIS CASE
RATHER THAN BY STATUTORY REQUIREMENT?
[Sunpeace answers in the affirmative; The United States, on
behalf of CRACT, and New Union, as amicus, answer in the
negative.]
A. Is CRACT's Voluntary Preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement Reviewable?
1. Federal question jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Federal
courts may only adjudicate cases over which they have ex-
press authority to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Per-
sons seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction have the burden of
proving at the outset that the court has authority to hear the
case. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S.
178 (1936). In other words, the presumption is against find-
ing jurisdiction. Consent to jurisdiction does not result in ju-
risdiction where it would not otherwise exist. Mitchell v.
Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). The challenge to jurisdic-
tion can be raised at any time by either party. Capron v. Van
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804). A challenge to juris-
diction may be raised for the first time on appeal. McCormick
v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 192 (1825). Also, the court
may at any time object to subject matter jurisdiction. Louis-
ville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
A federal court may only adjudicate a case if there exists
both statutory and constitutional authority for federal juris-
diction. The United States Constitution provides for the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts in Article III. The language
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specifically relevant to this case, which is now referred to as
"federal question" jurisdiction, reads "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;"
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.-1.
The leading case interpreting the scope of the Constitu-
tion's grant of authority is Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824). In this case the
Supreme Court determined that because the Bank of the
United States was created by federal law, any law suit initi-
ated by the Bank would fall within federal jurisdiction. Id. at
828. Therefore, following Osborn, any case in which federal
law forms an ingredient, whether or not the decision turns
upon that federal law, comes within federal jurisdiction. Be-
cause the present case comes from a federal statute, federal
courts have constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction.
However, the constitution's broad description of judicial
power reaching all cases "arising under" the laws of the
United States has been narrowed by the federal judiciary
seeking to limit the number of cases they must hear. The
"federal question" jurisdictional statute declares that "[tihe
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. 1331 (1988). The language is un-
changed from its enactment in 1875, 18 Stat. 470, ch. 137,
except for the elimination of a jurisdictional amount in 1980.
The scant legislative history accompanying the 1875 statute
appears clear, "This bill gives precisely the power which the
Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." 2 Cong.
Rec. 4986-87 (1874) quoted in Donald L. Doernberg, There's
No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded
Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 602, (1987). Yet, deci-
sional law consistently reads the statutory grant of authority
more narrowly than the nearly identical language in the
constitution.
The current rule to be gleaned from the cases interpret-
ing the federal question jurisdictional statute is as follows: a
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dispute "arises under" federal law if it is clear from within
the four corners of the plaintiff's complaint that either the
plaintiff's cause of action is founded in federal law or, if the
complaint is founded in state law, a federal law capable of
creating a cause of action itself, is itself a necessary ingredi-
ent of the plaintiff's claim. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (ruling that the federal law
forming the federal ingredient must be capable of creating a
cause of action); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 667 (1950) (stating that if the federal element exists only
as a defense to the plaintiff's claim, then federal jurisdiction
is lacking); Gully v. First Nat. Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (ex-
plaining that the federal element, to be essential must be of
the nature that its interpretation or construction determines
the outcome of the action); American Well Works Co. v. Layne
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) (stating that when a law
creates the cause of action in the case, the suit "arises under"
that law); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)
(establishing the well-pleaded complaint rule).
Application of this rule to the instant question squarely
places the action within federal jurisdiction. However argu-
ments opposing jurisdiction, which would likely be raised by
New Union and the United States, should focus on the points
raised in the preceding paragraphs. Sunpeace may include in
its counter to these arguments an assertion of subject matter
jurisdiction based on ancillary, or supplemental jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Supplemental jurisdiction
Supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), is essentially the codification of common law
ancillary jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is the authority
of federal court to hear claims that would not otherwise come
within federal jurisdiction but are part of the same set of cir-
cumstances or "common nucleus of operative facts," from
which the federal claim arises. United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The constitutional authority
for ancillary jurisdiction, and now supplemental jurisdiction,
is based in the Article III grant of power to decide "cases" and
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"controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also, Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824)
(stating Congress has the power to grant federal jurisdiction
over non-federal claims arising from the same set of circum-
stances as the federal "ingredient").
In light of the authorization of supplemental jurisdiction,
if New Union or the United States argue against federal ju-
risdiction over the question of CRACT's violation of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act in it's EIS preparation,
Sunpeace should argue that it arises out of the same set of
facts as the Clean Air Act claim. The Clean Air Act claim is
expressly authorized by the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993). The NEPA
claim arises out of the same set of facts, namely the ICTE
program and hangar and baghouse construction. Therefore,
the federal court should have jurisdiction to decide both the
Clean Air Act claim and the NEPA claim together in the
same action.
3. Jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure
Act
Section 701(b)(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) defines "agency" as "each authority of the Government
of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency, but does not include [excep-
tions].... ." 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (1988). Section 701(a) ex-
cludes from judicial review "(1) [agency actions pursuant to]
statutes [that] preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action
[that] is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a) (1988). Thus, the APA applies to all agencies of the
federal government except for those agencies expressly ex-
cluded in the APA. Judicial review is available in all in-
stances except where the APA or the particular organic
statute at issue excludes review, or where the agency action
is committed to agency discretion.
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a. Preclusion
New Union and the United States may argue that either
of exceptions codified in APA section 701(a) apply to CRACT's
environmental impact statement preparation. However, in
doing so, face an uphill battle against a strong presumption
in favor of review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (restricting the agency discretion
exception to only those situations where the court finds no
"law to apply"); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
(granting pre-enforcement review of rules enacted by the
Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the power of the fed-
eral judiciary to review the actions of the executive branch of
the federal government).
The statutory preclusion exception declared in APA sec-
tion 701(a)(1) is rarely allowed and language barring review
completely is uncommon since this could deny due process to
some claimants. In such a situation, when a party challeng-
ing agency action challenges the enabling act on constitu-
tional grounds, the bar to review does not apply. Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Decisions upholding statutory
preclusion have only applied it to challenges of agency action
where the validity of the statute is not questioned. Oestereich
v. Selective Serv. Sys. Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968). More
recent decisions have used "preclusion" as a way of denying
standing to certain classes of plaintiffs. Block v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (prohibiting consumers
from challenging orders by the Secretary of Agriculture set-
ting minimum price supports for milk). Another related ar-
gument is that where the enabling statute expressly provides
for one judicial review procedure, it impliedly precludes all
other review procedures. In either situation, the statutory
language will indicate the presence of the preclusion issue.
There is no such language in either the APA or National En-
vironmental Policy Act, hence statutory preclusion should not
bar review.
The exception described in APA section 701(a)(2), shield-
ing from judicial review those decisions committed to agency
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss2/6
1995]
discretion, is also narrow. The leading case on this issue is
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971). Here the Supreme Court held that where some statu-
tory standards are present for a reviewing court to apply in
its analysis of the questioned agency action, then the agency
action is not completely committed to agency discretion. Id.
In other words, if there is some law for the reviewing court to
apply to the agency action, the action is not exempt from judi-
cial review.
The only major exception to this general presumption in
favor of review is in situations of agency decisions refusing
enforcement of a statute or regulation within its authority.
In such cases, the refusal to take enforcement measures is
presumptively unreviewable. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821 (1985) (denying review of Food and Drug Administration
refusal to act on prisoners' challenge that drugs used in lethal
injections had not been approved for use in executions). The
Department of Interior and CRACT are not the agencies em-
powered to enforce the National Environmental Policy Act,
therefore the Overton Park standard applies.
The National Environmental Policy Act gives the review-
ing court ample law and standards to apply. The purposes of
the act is to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural resources important to the na-
tion." 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). Therefore, CRACT's environ-
mental impact statement will not be deemed committed to
agency discretion. Hence, the agency discretion exception
will not bar review.
b. Standing
APA Section 702 grants the right of review to any "per-
son suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). This
raises the questions of constitutional standing and standing
to challenge agency action.
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The doctrine of "standing" emanates from the "cases" and
"controversies" language of Article III of the United States
Constitution. U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 1. "The question of
standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The Supreme
Court has specified three basic constitutional standing
requirements.
The plaintiff must allege actual or imminent injury that
is neither conjectural nor hypothetical. Id. at 499-501. This
requires that at the "irreducible minimum" the plaintiff
"show he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982).
The plaintiff must also allege that the injury is "fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
[is] likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Thus the plaintiff must
also establish the two requirements, causation between the
alleged injury and the challenged act, and redressabilty by
the court.
In addition to satisfying the constitutional standing re-
quirements, plaintiffs seeking to challenge federal agency ac-
tion must also satisfy the test announced in Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). This two-pronged test requires (1) personal injury in
fact, economic or otherwise to the plaintiff, caused by the de-
fendant's acts; and (2) the presence of the plaintiff arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or
constitutional provision at issue. Id. In this area a few im-
portant decisions dealing with the National Environmental
Policy Act and environmental interest group standing are
often cited.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the plain-
tiffs refused to allege injury to any of its members personally.
The Sierra Club instead sought creation of a new standing
test for the environment, sometimes referred to as "tree
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standing." The Supreme Court denied standing and held
that at least one member must allege personal injury. Id.
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), a group of
law students succeeded in establishing standing to sue based
on an allegation of injury to their "sense of aesthetics" caused
by litter in public parks. (The National Environmental Policy
Act lists as one of its goals "[to] assure for all Americans safe,
healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleas-
ing surroundings". 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988).) The cause of
the litter was alleged to be excessively high freight rates for
recycling materials. This case marks the outer limit of the
Court's standing generosity. Subsequent decisions have
tightened the requirements.
The recent tightening of the standing requirement for
challenging agency actions is exemplified in Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). In this case the
National Wildlife Federation alleged that two of its members
had visited areas near to the portions of land which the De-
partment of the Interior had recently reclassified. The al-
leged imminent injury was an adverse affect to the member's
aesthetic enjoyment caused by the reclassification. On these
facts the Supreme Court denied standing. Id. The Court's
change in approach to the issue in these two similar factual
scenarios may be due more to differences in its composition
than differences in the cases.
In the present problem, Sunpeace has members which
live in the vicinity of CRACT's ICTE operation. The ICTE
process results in large quantities of particulate matter dis-
charged into the air. When these fall they inevitably land on
the property of belonging some of Sunpeace's members. The
particles are breathed in by some of Sunpeace's members.
The operation affects property values of some of Sunpeace's
members' homes. Thus, Sunpeace satisfies the first prong of
the Data Processing test by properly alleging injury in fact
personally occurring to its members caused by the defendant
CRACT (United States).
The zone of interests protected by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act is furtherance of environmental protection,
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generally. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (1994). More specifically, sec-
tion 2 of the act includes in the "Congressional declaration of
purpose" the purpose of the act is "... to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and bio-
sphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man...." 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
The basic mechanism by which the act seeks to promote
its goals is by requiring preparation of environmental impact
statements, which by mandate must include discussion of al-
ternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1988). The regulations require that agencies "involve the
public in preparing and implementing" their environmental
impact statements. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1994). Thus,
CRACT's preparation of the environmental impact statement
and the ICTE program will fall within the zone of interests
protected by the National Environmental Policy Act. Having
satisfied both prongs of the Data Processing test, Sunpeace
should be able to successfully argue that it does have
standing.
c. Ripeness
APA Section 704 adds the requirement that the action
causing the alleged injury or legal wrong be a "final agency
action." "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
As an initial requirement, there must be some agency
action. In this case, Sunpeace will argue that both CRACT's
preparation of an environmental impact statement and its
failure to include the no action alternative in the statement
are "agency actions" causing injury.
The statute explains "preliminary, procedural, or inter-
mediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is
subject to review [only] on the review of the final agency ac-
tion." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). This requires that aggrieved
persons wait until the agency has reached a "final action"
before they may have review of any part of the process result-
ing in that final action. This "final agency action" require-
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ment of section 701 raises the questions of ripeness and
exhaustion.
The ripeness inquiry seeks to determine whether the dis-
pute has reached a threshold level of adversity sufficiently
forming a dispute upon which the court can act. The legal
test for determining whether a dispute is ripe for review is
stated in Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The
two part test asks: (1) is the legal issue presented fit for re-
view?; and (2) would withholding review impose a substantial
hardship on the parties seeking review. Id. at 149.
The key to satisfying the first requirement of "legal fit-
ness" is in the framing of the issue. The issue will be fit for
review if it does not require the type of technical factual anal-
ysis generally associated within agency supervision. The
more the question is formed as requiring purely legal analy-
sis, the more likely it will be fit for review. Sunpeace should
be able to sufficiently state the question in legal terms in or-
der to satisfy this prong of the Abbott Laboratories test.
Arguments by New Union and the United States should
focus on rooting the question in factual foundation and tech-
nical analysis. New Union and the United States would do so
with the goal of convincing the court that the matter is at
present best left within agency supervision. They should ar-
gue that the matter remain unfit for review until such future
time when a more clearly defined legal question, capable of
deciding the matter, arises.
The "substantial hardship" requirement looks for a clear
demonstration of hardship rather than mere speculative or
uncertain harm. On this point Sunpeace should propose vari-
ous ways in which CRACT's failure to include the no action
alternative in the environmental impact statement has
caused actual hardship. Further, Sunpeace should also ar-
gue how delaying review will exacerbate or perpetuate the
harm.
New Union and the United States should logically re-
spond by stressing the speculative nature of Sunpeace's alle-
gations in light of CRACT's finding of no significant impact to
the environment resulting from the ICTE operation. In the
1995]
31
782 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
absence of significant impact, failure to consider termination
of the project is arguably harmless. Therefore, Sunpeace's
claimed hardship is made to appear more theoretical, and
hence less urgent.
d. Exhaustion
Also arising out of the APA section 704 "final order" re-
quirement is the exhaustion requirement. Out of this lan-
guage flows a presumption that a dispute should remain
within an agency until all decision making channels have
been followed. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969),
lists a group of factors both in favor of and against exhaus-
tion. In favor of leaving the dispute in the agency supervision
are: (1) the benefit of agency expertise; (2) agency autonomy;
(3) formation of a more complete record at the agency level;
and (4) preservation of judicial resources. In favor of finding
agency channels exhausted are: (1) lack of agency authority
to grant needed remedy; (2) evidence that the agency has
reached a decision that it will not change; (3) irreparable in-
jury to the person seeking review; and (4) challenges to the
constitutionality of the agency structure. Id.
While exhaustion does not form a major issue in the
problem, the competitors may address some of the points
above. New Union and the United States would logically ar-
gue in favor of leaving the dispute in agency supervision.
Sunpeace will argue in favor of finding agency exhaustion.
e. Standard of Review
Section 706 of the APA briefly states the standards of
available for review of different agency actions. The leading
case for interpreting section 706 is Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The first direc-
tion prior to choosing the appropriate standard is to make a
"searching and careful" inquiry into the facts to determine
the agency action. Id. at 416. This requires an examination
of both sides of the record.
In reviewing an agency's factual determinations, three
standards are available: de novo review; substantial evi-
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dence; and, arbitrary and capricious or abuse of agency dis-
cretion. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). De novo review is used only
when a statute specifically authorizes it, or "when the action
is adjudicatory in nature and the agency's fact-finding proce-
dures are inadequate," or when "issues that were not before
the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudi-
catory agency action." Overton Park at 415.
The substantial evidence standard is used only in when
reviewing an agency decision falling within sections 556, and
557 referring to formal agency rulemaking and formal agency
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). The "arbitrary and ca-
pricious or abuse of agency discretion" standard of review is
the default standard. Thus, if the case is subject to review
and neither the de novo standard, nor the substantial evi-
dence standard apply, then the reviewing court should look to
determine if the agency decision at issue was arbitrary, capri-
cious or an abuse of agency discretion.
CRACT's environmental impact statement preparation
cannot be characterized as formal rulemaking or formal adju-
dication, therefore, the substantial evidence standard will not
apply. Sunpeace should argue for de novo review since this
provides the reviewing court the widest discretion. New
Union and the United States will characteristically seek the
arbitrary and capricious standard because this gives the un-
derlying agency action the greatest deference.
B. Should CRACT Be Held To Comply With the
National Environmental Policy Act for Its Voluntary
Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement?
1. Statutory requirements
a. Purpose and goals
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70 (1988), was the first statute to require
comprehensive environmental analysis of federal administra-
tive operations by the federal courts. NEPA section 2, the
"Congressional declaration of purpose" clause states that:
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The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare
of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological sys-
tems and natural resources important to the nation; and to
establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
NEPA section 101(b) creates a "Continuing responsibility
of Federal Government to use all practicable means to im-
prove and coordinate Federal Plans, functions, programs, and
resources." This section lists six goals that the act aspires to
achieve:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc-
tive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing
surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the en-
vironment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or
other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever
possible, an environment which supports diversity and va-
riety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource
use which will permit high standards of living and a wide
sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and ap-
proach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988). Therefore under NEPA all
branches of the federal government are required to comply
with both the substantive obligations and "use all practicable
means" to achieve its policy goals. As a facility operated of




b. Substantive obligations on federal agencies
NEPA lists the substantive obligations it requires of fed-
eral agencies beginning in section 102. These obligations in-
clude the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for certain federal actions. The EIS requirement and
public information mandate are the major mechanisms by
which NEPA promotes its objectives.
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest ex-
tent possible:.. .(2)all agencies of the Federal Government
shall... (C) include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii)
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alterna-
tives to the proposed action...
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Under the statutory language,
EIS preparation, which includes coverage of alternatives to
the proposed action, is only required for major federal actions
which significantly affect the quality of the environment.
In addition to the requirements of 102(2)(C)(iii), section
102(2)(E) requires that all agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment shall "study, develop, and describe appropriate alterna-
tives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which
involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of
available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1988). This lan-
guage of section 102(2)(E) is not limited to "major federal ac-
tions." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
Furthermore, section 102(2)(E) requires more than mere dis-
cussion of alternatives as mandated by 102(2)(C)(iii). See En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F.
Supp. 749 (E.D.Ark. 1971). The language of section 102(2)(E)
states that the agency must study and develop alternatives,
in addition to discussion in the EIS. Moreover, section
102(2)(E) may apply even where an EIS is not required.
Further emphasis on public information comes from
NEPA section 102(2)(G) which requires all agencies to "make
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available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and
individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, main-
taining, and enhancing the quality of the environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(G) (1988). This section further solidifies the
federal agency's obligation to "lay their cards on the table in
full public view." Wisconsin v. Callaway, 371 F. Supp. 807,
811 (W.D.Wis. 1974). This obligation has also been inter-
preted to extend to require supplemental impact statements
to accommodate recent information. See, Sierra Club v. Ma-
son, 365 F. Supp. 47, 49 (D.C.Conn. 1973).
2. NEPA compliance
a. FONSI
New Union and the United States will argue that they
have met the substantive and policy goals of NEPA. They
will argue that the hangar and baghouse project did not re-
quire EIS preparation because it did not result in a signifi-
cant impact to the environment. Instead, CRACT was only
required to issue the finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). CRACT did issue the FONSI, and therefore has
complied with the statute. CRACT may also argue that it
also complied with the public information mandate of NEPA
section 102(2)(G). By voluntarily supplying an EIS, CRACT
provided additional information to the public.
In response Sunpeace will argue that CRACT's simulta-
neously issuing a FONSI and publishing a notice that it
would prepare an EIS voluntarily is contradictory. Sunpeace
will argue that CRACT's participation in the NEPA process is
mandatory since CRACT is part of the federal government.
Sunpeace will argue that CRACT was required by NEPA sec-
tion 102(2)(E) to "study, develop, and describe appropriate al-
ternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative
uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1988).
Thus, any public information supplied voluntarily is incom-
plete without discussion of the no action alternative. Also,
Sunpeace should argue that supply of public information con-
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cerning the no action alternative is required by NEPA section
102(2)(G).
b. Scope of the EIS
The United States and New Union will state that the
proper scope of the EIS was the hangar and baghouse con-
struction. The ICTE program was discussed in the EIS only
to clarify the purpose of the baghouse and hangar proposal.
The scope of the EIS was not the entire ICTE program, there-
fore it did not need to include discussion of the alternative of
eliminating the ICTE program.
The hangar and baghouse proposal EIS included consid-
eration of an alternative that would continue operation with-
out the hangar and baghouse at a level of production that
would comply with the Clean Air Act. This alternative ad-
dresses the no action alternative by describing a course of ac-
tion that would not require the proposed construction.
United States and New Union will assert that this "continued
operation" alternative satisfies the "no action" alternative re-
quired by both NEPA sections 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(E).
3. Policy arguments
Sunpeace will rely on the purpose and goals of NEPA,
asserting that federal agencies must comply with all of the
statute's provisions. New Union and the United States will
maintain that CRACT has complied with NEPA goals and re-
quirements. They will also propose that CRACT should not
be forced to submit to more rigorous compliance merely be-
cause CRACT went beyond its required duty under NEPA.
New Union and the United States will state that CRACT's
voluntary generation of an EIS was actually in furtherance of
NEPA public information goals. Therefore, to punish CRACT
for failure to satisfy one of NEPA's requirements, which is a
disputed point in itself, would actually work in contradiction
to the purpose of the act as a whole.
Sunpeace's response should logically follow that once an
agency submits itself to a regulatory scheme involving public
notice and information, the agency has an obligation to corn-
1995] 787
37
788 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
ply with that scheme in the procedures provided. CRACT's
publication if its plan to issue an EIS lead SUNPEACE to
believe that full NEPA compliance would follow. This belief
persuaded SUNPEACE to forgo challenging the FONSI. To
exempt CRACT from full NEPA compliance would frustrate
the public information goal of NEPA by allowing CRACT to
publish misinformation.
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